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REVOCABILITY OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY WHERE
PRINCIPAL HAS CONTRACTED NOT TO
REVOKE WITHIN A CERTAIN PERIOD
Piper et al. v. Wells'
On January 6th, 1937, P (principal) entered into a sealed
"Standard Multiple Listing Contract" with A (agent)
whereby the latter undertook to sell P's realty for a commission. The contract stipulated: "This authority shall
continue for a minimum period of three months and not
more than six months from date hereof, except that either
party, by giving thirty days' written notice, may cancel this
contract at the end of said minimum period or at any time
thereafter." A advertised the property and endeavored to
interest prospects but his efforts were fruitless, and, on
February 28th, 1937, P wrote A cancelling the contract.
A acknowledged the cancellation on March 2nd, 1937, stating, "if you are of the same mind at the expiration of your
thirty days notice, we shall be glad to cancel this listing."
Early in March, through the efforts of an outside broker,
whose activity was within the purview of the present contract, a customer for P's property was obtained who was
willing and able to purchase. P rejected the offer. A thereupon sued P under the Speedy Judgment Act for commissions on the theory that the contract was still subsisting,
presumably because by the terms of the contract the authority could not be revoked prior to April 6th, 1937. Held, A
could not recover in such an action. As A was without
authority after February 28th (the date of P's letter cancelling the contract) to sell P's property, he was without
power to enter into an agreement with a purchaser which
could bind P to pay commissions under the contract.
In this, the Maryland Court of Appeals followed a rule
of law in accord with the great weight of authority,2 i. e.,
"where one is given authority to sell the lands or other
property . . . and is to have a certain commission or share

out of the proceeds for his services, the authority may be
revoked at the will of the principal, even though in terms
1

2 A. (2nd) 28 (Md. 1938).
2 Restatement of Agency, Secs. 118, 119, 138 comment b; 386, comment b;
2 C. J. S. Sec. 74a; 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) Sec. 279; 1 Mechem,
Agency (2nd Ed.) Secs. 560-587.
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it was declared to be exclusive or irrevocable. I" The Court,
however, emphasized the generally recognized distinction
between the power to revoke and the right to revoke, quoting from Mechem :"

"... the principal always ... (has) .. . the power
to revoke but not the right to do so in those cases
wherein he has agreed not to exercise his power during
a certain period. If, in the latter case, he does exercise his power he must respond in damages."
The justification or rationale for the power-to-revoke
doctrine is set forth in the Restatement of Agency :'
I"... altho a principal has contracted that he will
not terminate the authority of an agent to act for him,
he has the power to do so, and the agent is not thereafter privileged to act in accordance with the terms of
such contract. To give the agent a privilege to continue would be to give him an informal power to enforce specific performance of the contract, requiring
the continuance of a confidential relationship, the primary purposes of which are benefit to the principal
and the performance of his wishes."
Section 138, comment b, of the Restatement, also embraces the factual situation involved in the principal case:
"If . . . the power so given is held for the benefit
of the principal and the agent is interested in its exercise only because it entitles him to compensation for
exercising it, then even though the principal contracts
not to terminate it, and altho the agent gives consideration therefor, as by acting or agreeing to act, the power
is not a power given as security as the term is herein
used. An agent's interest in earning his agreed compensation is an: ordinary incident of agency and neither
a contract that the principal will not revoke nor a contract that the agent may protect his right to earn commissions will deprive the principal of control over acts
to be done by the agent on his behalf." 6
1 Mechem, ibid, Sec. 586.
6 Ibid, Sec. 568, and see Restatement of Agency, Sec. 450, comment a, and
455.
5 Restatement of Agency, Sec. 386, comment b.
6 See Restatement of Agency, Sees. 138, 139. ".. . A power given as security is not terminated by (a) revocation by the creator of the power ... "
3
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These sections, like the instant case, do not seem to
abrogate the principal's obligation to respond in damages
for breach of his contract not to revoke.7
There is language in some of the earlier Maryland cases
that would seem to warrant holding a power of the sort
herein involved irrevocable, viz., "an agent's authority to
act for his principal is always revocable at the will of the
principal by withdrawing his authority unless the authority be coupled with an interest, or has been conferred on
the agent for a valuable consideration moving from him
to the principal."'
Professor Casner points out in the
Maryland Annotations to the Restatement of Agency:
"The facts of these cases, however, do not present
situations where the consideration is given for the bare
agency power. Thus, it is suggested, that the statement referred to above (power irrevocable where agent
gives valuable consideration to principal) is meant to
apply to a case where the valuable consideration operates to give to the agent some interest to protect, other
than just his employment, or that the principal cannot
revoke9 without subjecting himself to liability for damages. "
The instant case, in its, apparent holding that suit failed
because predicated on the existence of a contract which
the Court considered appropriately canceled, indicated
that some recovery might have been had if suit had been
brought for breach. This leaves the reader in doubt as
to whether the Court visualized the possible recovery of
commissions less such expenditures as would have been
Ibid, See. 451, comment a: "one who has a power given as security, although in name an agent, does not hold the power for the benefit of the
power giver, and such a power Is not subject to revocation by the power
giver, nor by his death if the power is one given to secure the performance
of a duty not terminated by the death of the power giver."
7 Restatement of Agency, Sec. 439, comment d; 445, comment f.
8 Attrill v. Paterson, 58 Md. 226, 250 (1882) ; Smith v. Dare, 89 Md. 47,
51, 42 A. 909 (1889) ; Howard v. Street, 125 Md. 289, 300, 93 A. 923 (1915) ;
Hill v. Iglehart, 145 Md. 537, 552, 125 A. 843 (1924) ; Acker v. Cecil National Bank, 162 Md. 1, 3, 157 A. 897 (1932). Italics supplied. An authority coupled with an Interest "is an interest in the thing itself on which
the power is to be exercised, and not an interest in that which Is to be
produced by the exercise of the power." Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat.
174, 5 L. Ed. 589 (1823) ; Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. St. 266 (1866).
Maryland Annotations, Restatement of Agency, See. 118.
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made by the agent,'0 or whether it visualized merely recovery on the agent's right to reimbursement from his principal for moneys spent in reliance upon the principal's
promise to keep his contract open."

C. I. F. CONTRACTS-PASSAGE

OF TITLE-

RISK OF LOSS
Obrecht v. Crawford et al.'
Obrecht and Company, conducting a feed business in
Baltimore, contracted to buy from Crawford, Keen and Co.,
feed exporters in South America, 500 Tons of Argentine
Feed Flour, c. i. f. Baltimore, on irrevocable sight letter of
credit to be opened at Buenos Aires. Seller was ready, willing, and able to perform, but the buyer, in violation of his
contract, failed to open the letter of credit. The flour was
perishable, and the seller resold it for the account of the
buyer. The proceeds of the sale were less than the original
contract price, and seller brought suit to recover the difference. Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff, and
defendant buyer appealed. Held: Affirmed.
The main question presented to the Court of Appeals
was whether the jury were properly instructed as to the
amount of recoverable damages. The Court, however, in
reaching their decision, presented a clear statement of the
law of passage of title and risk of loss, under a c. i. f. contract for the sale of goods. This note will be limited to a
discussion of the latter points.
The letters "c. i. f." are abbreviations of the words,
"cost, insurance and freight", and when used in connection with a contract for the sale of goods, signify that the
10See Note, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 366, annotating Chloe v. Rogers, 31 Okla.
255, 121 P. 201 (1912) ; Goldberg v. McNaghten Inv. Co., 112 Kan. 348, 211
P. 157 (1922). In the latter case it was said: "The agent could not . . .
be prevented from earning a commission within the period of his appointment while he was conducting negotiations with a prospective tenant."
See Note, L. R. A. 1918D 731; and Restatement of Agency, Sec. 455, comment e, Sec. 445, comments a and f; and Sec. 453, comment c. Apparently
the right to commissions (less expenses that would be incurred in obtaining same) depends on the certainty of performance by the agent but for
the wrongful revocation, and possibly his ability to prove this without violating his duty of obedience to his principal.
"18 Am. Juris. 1007, and cases cited note 18, p. 1008; ibid, 1105; Restatement of Agency, Sec. 439, comment d.
12 A. (2d)

1 (Md. 1938).

